Gathering Intelligence or Hunting Terrorists?

Detailing the decades-long history of the relationship between Special Operations Forces and the CIA, “Eyes, Ears and Daggers” (Hoover, 2016) examines the critical role that accurate intelligence-gathering plays in accomplishing military goals. This interview with author Thomas Henriksen was conducted via email. 

You start the book talking about Nathan Hale, the patriotic schoolteacher-turned-spy hanged by the British in 1776. That raises an interesting point, one viewers of “Washington’s Spies” on AMC channel must wonder about: how much of a role did intelligence really play in the Revolutionary War?

General George Washington, when he took command of the Continental army, resolved to acquire intelligence about his British opponents by every means. Earlier when Washington served under the British officer Edward Braddock, he learned a valuable lesson from his service during the French and Indian War. Braddock was surprised, defeated, and killed at Fort Duquesne (now Pittsburgh), due partly to ignorance about his enemy’s forces. The incident had a singular impact on young Washington. During the Revolutionary War, he dispatched spies to report on the Red Coats’ movements. He also sought to keep information about his forces out of British hands. 

The Continental Congress also grasped the importance of foreign intelligence. It established the Committee of Secret Correspondence to gather intelligence about foreign governments from Americans living in Europe. The American well-wishers corresponded back to the colonialists about the predisposition of European governments toward the American Revolution.

Fast-forwarding to World War II, you write that Franklin D. Roosevelt trusted William J. “Wild Bill” Donovan, the man most responsible for setting up America’s permanent espionage agencies. But by the time of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, John F. Kennedy told confidants that he wished he’d have put his brother Bobby in charge of the CIA. How important is it for a president to have confidence in the intel community? And how rare is it?

President John Kennedy felt betrayed by the CIA for the Bay of Pigs fiasco, when U.S.-trained Cuban rebels landed on the now-infamous Cuban beach intending to topple Fidel Castro’s fledgling dictatorship. The CIA had kept the Pentagon out of intelligence loop when hatching the invasion plan. The CIA did the training of the Cuban exile forces. And the CIA painted a rosy picture of what the insurgent band could accomplish. When the invaders came to grief, Kennedy suffered a severe political setback that colored his views about the CIA for the rest of his presidency. He disliked the CIA and put his trust in the Special Forces (Green Berets), who he rescued from the Pentagon’s budget axe. The Green Berets and the Navy SEALs (which Kennedy ushered into service) played prominent roles during the Vietnam War. Obviously, it is important for a president to have confidence in his intel community. But mostly they have doubts about the nation’s spies, particularly when they deliver un-wanted assessments. For example, George W. Bush and his vice president, Dick Cheney, wanted the intelligence community to produce iron-clad assessments of Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction stockpiles. They were less than enthusiastic about the lukewarm or moderate assessments of Iraq’s nuclear and chemical arms.

Throughout the history of the relationship between the CIA and the Pentagon, there has long been a desire in the Pentagon to create parallel organizations which have similar missions as the CIA. In your research, did you come to a conclusion about whether CIA-led covert missions fare better than those run by the Pentagon?

The problems between the CIA and Special Operations Forces arise whenever either security arm crosses into the lane of the other entity. When the CIA, which was set up mainly to gather and analyze intelligence about America’s adversaries, engages in military-type missions, such as training of host-nation forces in countries the U.S. is at war with, it raises hackles in SOF or the Pentagon. The Defense Department feels it should be taking the lead on this mission. Likewise, when the SOF cross into the CIA’s preserve, this action runs counter to the intelligence agency’s view of its rightful prerogatives.

The record is mixed on which security agency is better than the other. Each can lay claim to successes and failures. The CIA was generally well regarded as advisors among the Montagnard ethnic minority in South Vietnam in the early stages of the Southeast Asian war. The CIA was seen as having a truer understanding of counter-insurgency principles than most conventional Army officers. But when it comes to super-take downs of terrorists in commando-style raids, the Army Delta Forces and SEAL Team Six have no peer.

What allowed the military special operations forces and the CIA to work so well together in general during the small wars of the 1990s like Bosnia and various Latin American conflicts compared to earlier times – and larger conflicts – such as Korea?

With regard to the cooperation in small wars of the 1990s and Bosnia, the smooth interaction between SOF and CIA was due to clear delineation of duties among the entities. In Bosnia, the CIA and other intelligence agencies, sometimes foreign ones, provided the information necessary to execute commando raids. Then, the SEALs operated like a super-trained SWAT team to arrest the alleged war criminals and take them to the International Court for trial.  In the case of Colombia and the death of Pablo Escobar, the Pentagon used small teams of Delta Force to advise and employ technological wizardry to track down and fix the location of the drug kingpin, allowing the Colombian police to kill Escobar.

Does their drone usage represent mission creep that upsets the balance of power between the agency and the Pentagon?

I feel the same about drone strikes. On most occasions, the military should operate drones in kinetic operations. But there may occur the need for a president to have the option of plausible deniability that a CIA-orchestrated operation provides.  The usage of drone strikes in the immediate years after the 9/11 attacks did represent a sort of imbalance, with the CIA handling most attacks. During the Obama administration, the balance was restored with the Pentagon gradually assuming responsibility for most drone strikes, and, of course, all airstrikes from conventional aircraft.

Should the CIA return to a support role in the form of intelligence gathering rather than actively carrying out American foreign policy with drones?

In my opinion, the CIA and the SOF handled the anti-terror war very well. They gradually overcame their “stove-piped” tendencies to withhold information from each other. Army General Stanley McChrystal, who served in Iraq and Afghanistan, deserves the lion’s share of the credit for implementing fusion cells which brought together SOF, CIA, FBI, and NSA officers to share information to find and fix the location of terrorists, who were often neutralized. The CIA and SOF kept the terrorist networks off balance by killing and capturing leaders and other personnel.  But they alone cannot eliminate all terrorism. That will take a much more comprehensive strategy, deploying greater forces and resources to failing states with terrorist havens.  

Broadly stated, how would you describe the proper role for the CIA in assuring America’s national security?

In my opinion, it is important to maintain the flexibility of the current arrangement between CIA and SOF. There are times when small teams of CIA field officers (most of whom have prior military service in SOF) will be necessary to train foreign forces. This was done in Syria with good results. In one instance the CIA performed better than the Pentagon in host-nation training. Per contra, there are times when SOF or other Pentagon personnel are better at spying in nations not at war with the United States than CIA operatives, particularly when tactical intelligence is the goal.