A 21st-Century Military Strategy

The century is still young. A rising power in the Pacific is challenging the United States, asymmetric threats are becoming increasingly concerning, and the U.S. military is trying to ascertain its role in an evermore interconnected world. These details could easily describe our current era, but they also pertain to the challenges of a century ago. It was in those years, at the beginning of the 20th century, that the writings of a brilliant strategic and tactical mind predicted the challenges of Japan’s rise, outlined an approach to amphibious operations, and revolutionized the role of the U.S. Marine Corps. 21st Century Ellis: Operational Art and Strategic Prophecy for the Modern Era harnesses those writings and, with commentary and context from editor B.A. Friedman, applies them to contemporary challenges.

Lieutenant Colonel Earl Hancock “Pete” Ellis, born in Kansas in 1880, enlisted with the Marines at the turn of the century and quickly rose through the ranks. In 1902, the young second lieutenant was sent to the Philippines, where the United States faced a counterinsurgency in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War. The most seminal point in Ellis’s career path may have been his stint at the Naval War College beginning in 1911, first as a student, then as an instructor, writing and lecturing on advanced base operations and evolving into a strategic thinker.

After the United States entered World War I, Ellis, then a major, accompanied General John A. Lejeune on a tour of the western front in France, advising on the role of the Marines in a war of unprecedented scale. After the war’s end, Ellis drifted between jobs and continued to write. Despite his personal struggle with alcoholism that would eventually lead to an early death at the age of forty-two, Ellis had a remarkable effect on the Marine Corps, and on military strategy and tactics more broadly. His prescient writings remain remarkably relevant a century later.

The book’s four chapters highlight Ellis’s writing on counterinsurgency, combined warfare, the modern Marine Corps, and the Pacific. In each case, Friedman provides useful background on the context in which Ellis wrote the passage, as well as thoughtful analysis of the writings’ modern implications.

Although he does not use the term counterinsurgency, Ellis’s 1921 article “Bush Brigades” may be just as applicable to today’s anti-guerrilla operations as those of a hundred years ago. Informed by his experiences in the Philippines, Ellis describes what was then an innovative approach of organizing fighting units for counterinsurgency operations, clearing an area of insurgents, and establishing fortified posts. Friedman likens his approach to the “clear, hold, build” method used in modern operations in Afghanistan. Ellis astutely notes the importance of insurgents’ connection to the population of a given area, and warns against the use of unnecessarily harsh counterinsurgency tactics that would endanger and alienate civilians. Perhaps most importantly, Ellis understands the importance of a mission’s perceived legitimacy in maintaining troops’ morale.

Combined warfare, or cooperation with allies’ armed forces, is another subject on which Ellis’s writings remain relevant. Drawing on his observations in Europe during World War I, Ellis describes the importance of military unit training and teamwork. He points to a general lack of coordination in combined operations, and recommends increasing the number of coordinating personnel and improving communications and information management. As Friedman notes, the U.S. military has made great strides since Ellis’s time, but these lessons remain relevant today, particularly with regard to unit training.

Recognizing the importance of logistics for naval operations, Ellis conceived of the modern Marine Corps: a collection of small, integrated units that included all the necessary components for seizing, securing, and defending an advanced base. These units, Ellis thought, could organize on a temporary basis as a larger expeditionary force to support the Navy in seizing ports for use as advanced bases in times of war.

Perhaps most relevant for today’s military planners and policymakers is Ellis’s superb analysis of the Pacific. At a time when the United States was facing the threat of Japan as a rising power, Ellis undertook a detailed analysis of the geography of the Pacific region, allowing him to predict, with impressive accuracy, the course of a then-distant war with Japan. At the time, amphibious warfare was widely considered impossible due to the advanced nature of new offensive weapons. Ellis’s writings challenged the established wisdom and conceived of a specialized, amphibious force trained to support naval and air operations and project power from the sea. Such a force would prove essential in the eventual confrontation with Japan.

Despite the transformations in technology, politics, and the structure of the international system that have taken place over the past century, many of Ellis’s writings remain relevant today, and Friedman does an excellent job of connecting Ellis’s writings to modern-day applications. He rightly recognizes the importance of Ellis’s study of the Pacific for the modern challenge of rising Chinese power in the region. Ellis’s warning of Japanese attempts to complicate and delay U.S. naval operations, aiming to wear down the U.S. fleet, call to mind today’s asymmetric threats, and the challenge of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) technologies currently being pursued by China and other countries. Ellis’s greatest legacy, Friedman argues, is his work in shaping the modern Marine Corps. Still, Friedman is careful not to draw parallels where they do not exist, noting that China is not Japan, and that naval warfare, as well as the United States’ role in the world, has changed drastically since Ellis’s time.

Although Ellis’s writings are occasionally weighed down by the minutiae of military tactics, detailed analysis of geography, and descriptions of archaic technology, the book makes interesting reading for all those interested in modern strategic challenges. Military planners would do well to read Ellis’s writings and Friedman’s analysis, but even civilian policymakers and students of international relations are likely to find this work worthwhile. While history doesn’t always repeat itself, it often sings a similar tune. This book helps relate that history to its modern day applications.