Computer World

It was always bold, impudent even, to insist that material substrates or elementary particles could have what it takes to anchor reality as such. Perhaps the greatest propaganda coup of scientific modernity has been to convince a good number of us that such a claim is nothing more than right common sense, while any hesitation to affirm it could only be a symptom of soft-headed superstition or unhinged irrationality. To this extent I have long been perplexed by those philosophers who defend or at least toy with simulationism, and who seem to relish the small frisson of transgression it so reliably delivers to them. The suggestion that reality is more “bit”-like than “it”-like, seems to be experienced by its defenders as a relatively safe venture into philosophical edgelordism, making the majority normie philosophers cling to their “its” that much more desperately. The problem is not only that “its” were never at all well-suited to the heavy role of anchoring reality —what exactly, tell us, shouts “Being!” about an atom or mote or corpuscle?—, but also that historically their tenure in that role was relatively brief… no, it might better be said, they were still pre-tenure, and therefore still easy to get rid of.